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MANAISM: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years a theory has appeared which purports to describe man's first explanatory reaction to his environment. For many years it was supposed that animism was this first reaction; but this new theory, variously called animatism, dynamism, manaism, pre-animism, etc., states that man first

* The writer wishes to express her thanks to President G. Stanley Hall, under whom this study was made, for advice and criticism; to Professor Mary Whiton Calkins for very helpful criticisms and suggestions; and to Dr. Louis N. Wilson, Librarian of Clark University, for courtesy and kindness in making available the literature for the study.

explains things, not in analogy to his own soul as animism holds, but rather by postulating a great force such as mana.¹

The present study attempts to evaluate this claim, first by a consideration of the statements made by the upholders of the view, and second by a study of those beliefs of primitive peoples which afford the material for this contention. Not only the beliefs of primitive peoples quoted by the holders of this theory but also comparable ones from other parts of the world have been considered. The material for this second part has, for the most part, been taken from accounts of so-called primitive religions; and although to us these accounts seem to contain a mixture of philosophy, psychology, anthropology, religion, etc., they will here be largely treated from the angle of their relation to religion.

In treating the material from this standpoint four problems seem to stand out: first, what is the nature of this mana which has been so prominent in primitive beliefs; second, is it true that manaism represents an explanatory reaction prior to animism—and if not, what is the relation of the two concepts; third, is manaism religion; fourth, is it magic. As the discussion centering around the theory of manaism is one of such comparatively recent date, we have reviewed at some length both the material on which the theory has been based and the interpretations which various writers have made of this material. The reader is thus enabled to judge of the worth of the theories and of the justification of our criticisms. In presenting the compilation of material which we have gathered from reports of primitive peoples selection has been made of that gathered from parts of the world which have not previously found a large place in the literature of pre-animistic discussions. Since the data from North America and Australia have been previously extensively cited, this study, in order to uphold its contentions, stresses the data of Africa and Australasia, exclusive of Australia.

As is necessary in dealing with such large areas, the collection of material used is limited. Selection of reports by the most reliable workers has been made and preference has been given to those writers who have spent many years among the people whom they report. Material reported in the last fifteen years has been most often used because earlier reports

¹ Mana is a Melanesian term, generally interpreted to mean impersonal power—a term representative of the concepts on which 'pre-animism' is based. It is similar to such terms as Wakanda, orenda, kici, etc. We have used the term manaism to express the beliefs in regard to mana and similar terms.

are current in the literature of pre-animism and also because it seems to us that this later literature shows more of a tendency to report what the native actually states than to report interpretations of these statements. In the space of this article, the wealth of material on the subject can only be indicated, but if we have given enough to point out the seeming inconsistencies in the various reports and to indicate wherein the points of disagreement lie—it should be of value. Whether or not our interpretation of the material gathered, proves, in the light of later investigations, to be acceptable and true, it is hoped that it has at least added something to the discussion.

II. NATURE OF MANAISM

We shall first give quotations from writers who in person have spent time among the primitive people whom they report. The authors state in these quotations what they think the primitive believes. These quotations are representative of the material on which writers have based a theory of pre-animism. We shall then give the various interpretations that have been made in regard to these beliefs. For the sake of convenience we shall call the first quotations, field-workers' reports and the discussions made upon the basis of these, interpretations. We realize that in the field-workers' reports there may be some interpretation.

a. Field-workers' Reports.

Dorsey (16:365) writes:—

"It has been asserted for several hundred years that the North American Indian was a believer in one Great Spirit." Very often Wakanda has been taken to mean a Supreme Being "but in the Zegiha, the language spoken by the Ponka and Omaha, Wakanda means "mysterious," or "powerful one." . . . Some of the old people say that their ancestors always believed in a supreme Wakanda or Mysterious Power."

Miss Fletcher (20:326-327) says concerning the Indian's belief in the nature of life:—

"The belief . . . involved two prominent ideas; first, that all things animate and inanimate were permeated by a common life; and second, that this life could not be broken but was continuous. . . . This power which brings things to pass is Wakoⁿ'da. The question arises did the Omaha regard Wakoⁿ'da as a Supreme Being? There is no evidence that he did so. . . . The word Wakoⁿ'da seems to express the Indian's idea of immanent life manifest in all things."

Mcgee (55:182) after enumerating many things that are called wakanda writes:—

"Thus the term is applied to all sorts of entities and ideas and was used indiscriminately as substantive and adjective, and with slight modification as verb and adverb . . . the idea expressed is indefinite, and cannot justly be rendered into 'spirit' much less into 'Great Spirit,' though it is easy to understand how the superficial inquirer . . . came to adopt and perpetuate the erroneous interpretation. The term may be translated into 'mystery' perhaps more satisfactorily than into any other single English word, yet this rendering is at the same time much too limited and much too definite. As used by the Siouan-Indian, *wakanda* vaguely connotes also 'power,' 'sacred,' 'ancient,' 'grandeur,' 'animate,' 'immortal,' and other words, yet does not express with any degree of fulness and clearness the ideas conveyed by these terms singly or collectively."

Major Powell in an introduction to Mr. Cushing's 'Zuni Folk Tales' (11:X-XI) writes:—

"In every language there is a term that expresses this magical power. Among the Iroquoian tribes it is called *orenda*; among the Siouan tribe some manifestations of it are called *pokunt*. Let us borrow one of these terms and call it 'orenda.' All unexplained phenomena are attributed to *orenda*."

Hewitt (33:33-36) in speaking of *orenda* writes:—

" . . . primeval man made the further assumption that in every body of his self-centred cosmos inheres immanently a mystic potency of diverse efficiency and purpose. . . . This hypothetic magic potency is, then, held to be the property of all things, of all bodies, and . . . is regarded as the efficient cause of all phenomena, all the activities of his environment."

Jones (41:183) tells us that the Algonkin Manitou is a solemn religious word:—

"It is a property which is felt to be everywhere—it enters into everything in nature, it is active and assumes various forms according to the individual. . . . The Algonkin peoples his world with manitou forces different in degree and kind. . . . Each object and being has the investment of a common, mystic, virtue which gives them all a common name, and that name is *manitou* . . . but wherein one differs from the other is in the nature of its function, and in the degree of possession of the cosmic substance."

In these quotations we see that first-hand reports of Indian thought show us a belief in a pervasive all-powerful force in the universe, a force which is present in varying degrees in all things. A belief in a similar great force was reported to exist among the Melanesians by Codrington (8:118-119):—

"The Melanesian mind is entirely possessed by a belief in a supernatural power or influence called almost universally, *mana*. This is what works to effect anything which is beyond the ordinary power of men, outside the common processes of nature, attaches itself to persons and to things and is manifested by results which can only be ascribed to its operation. . . . There is a belief in a force altogether distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good and evil, and which it is the greatest advantage to possess or control.

This is Mana. The word is common I believe to the whole Pacific. . . . It is a power or influence, not physical, and in a way supernatural, but it shows itself in physical force, or in any kind of power or excellence which a man possesses. This mana is not fixed in anything; but spirits, whether disembodied souls or supernatural beings, have it and can impart it; and it essentially belongs to personal beings to originate it, though it may act through the medium of water, or a stone or a bone."

b. Interpretations of these Reports

Students of Manaism have taken their clue from the reports from which these quotations have been given and have looked for evidences of such beliefs elsewhere. They have interpreted mana in a number of ways which may be roughly grouped under four headings: first, those who regard mana as a magical, impersonal force, the idea of which is obtained from observations of unusual natural phenomena; second, those who regard mana as a spiritual power, the conception of which arises from an unusual mental experience of an individual, such an experience as a great willing or emotional excitement; third, those who state that mana is an impersonal power, the consciousness of which comes through social activity experiences; fourth, those who regard mana as a personal spiritual power experienced while in social activities.

1. Impersonal, from the unusual.

J. King (44), who so far as we have been able to find was the first writer to bring together a number of different concepts of a great force such as mana, wakanda, boyla, states that man's first idea of force was not gained from personal beings but from physical force. This idea arose when something was incomprehensible to man. So long as things go smoothly man pays no attention to them, but let something baffle him and then due "to his very organic sensibilities" he will evolve the supernatural. Irving King (45) holds a somewhat similar view, in saying that those things which demand a "watch-out attitude" from man made him regard them as containing an unusual force. Preuss (61) states that the quality of *Verwandlungs-fähigkeit* in things gives rise to the idea of great force, mana. Hartland (30:679) states that there are certain characteristics of objects which make them appear very mysterious and that accordingly they are thought to have a "potentiality which is exactly expressed by the word, orenda." Schmidt (65) believes that mana is the power conceived through experiences with those things which will not fit into the normal or profane idea of causality. For Leuba (52) mana is an impersonal power, the concept of which arises from man's noticing the phenomenon of causal-

ity. To see how early man arrived at his idea of impersonal force Leuba goes to the child to see in what way *he* arrives at the concept. He finds that very early the child asks the question "What makes this go?" and observing this Leuba states (p. 78) "already he is in possession of the abstract idea of cause and effect." Leuba goes on to state that he believes that the idea of power implied in cause is that of an impersonal power and is in the child's possession before he is three years of age. In the same way primitive man arrives at an idea of impersonal power.

2. Mana as power, conceived from unusual mental experiences of the individual.

Brinton (3:47-60) interprets Wakanda as follows:

"The Wakan of the Dakota Indians is the deification of that peculiar quality or power which man is conscious of within himself as willing or directing a course to bring about certain results. . . . The universal postulate, the psychic origin of all religious thought, is the recognition or if you please, the assumption, that conscious volition is the ultimate source of all Force. It is the belief that behind the sensuous, phenomenal world, distinct from it, giving it form, existence, and activity lies the ultimate, invisible, immeasurable power of Mind, of conscious Will, of Intelligence, analogous in some way to our own and that man is in communication with it."

Moreover Brinton makes, what in the light of later discussions, we regard as a very significant statement, i.e., that this "Will-Power" is "posited" in moments of great excitement, "rapture, intoxication or frenzy."

Miss Fletcher has spent a great deal of time ascertaining the meaning of Wakanda. Of this common force running through all things she writes (19:598-600):

"While the conception of Wakoⁿ'da may appear somewhat vague, certain anthropomorphic attributes were ascribed to it, approximating to a sort of personality. . . . All experiences in life were believed to be directed by Wakoⁿ'da. . . . An old Indian explained 'All forms mark where Wakoⁿ'da has stopped and brought them into existence.' The belief that the power of Wakoⁿ'da is akin to the directive force of what man is conscious within himself, is implied in the old man's remark: each 'form' was the result of a 'stop' where there had been a distinct exercise of the will power, an act of the creative force of Wakoⁿ'da performed."

Again she writes:²

"In this conception man views all things from his own personality and from this standpoint predicates his relationship to animate and inanimate nature. Conscious within himself of an ability to move and to bring to pass, he regards motion, whether of body or of mind, as a universal ability and as the simplest and most fundamental mani-

² *Amer. Anthropologist*, N. S. Vol. 14, 1912, p. 38.

festation of a mysterious indwelling power that has brought all things into existence and is the cause of all movement."

Again of Wakonda she says (20:327) :

"All things were distinct from man but in the subtle bond of a common life, embodying the idea of will or directive energy, they were akin to him and could lend him the aid of their special powers, even as he could help or hinder his fellowman."

Marett's view seems to be a combination of these first two explanations of mana. For him mana is the power which is thought to be in objects which excite awe. He writes (54:10) :

"In response to, or at any rate in connection with, the emotions of awe, wonder, and the like, wherein feeling would seem for the time being to have outstripped the power of 'natural,' that is, reasonable, explanation, there arises in the region of human thought a powerful impulse to objectify and even personify the mysterious or 'super-natural' something felt."

This attitude of the mind, dictated by awe of the mysterious, Marett calls Supernaturalism. The objects which give rise to awe and are thus thought to have this extraordinary power are of many kinds; spirits, startling manifestations of nature, curious stones, animals, human remains, some diseases, blood, etc. One important source of awe that Marett especially stresses is that of magical acts. The heart of the magical affair he states is in the "spell" which in turn really reduces to an extraordinary exertion of will which is supposed to make the desired event take place. It is mana which accomplishes this end, mana—which "on its inner side is just this seemingly mysterious power of putting the magical act through, of willing semblance into reality." "The true source of mana immanent in the spell is the operator's exertion of will power." (p. 56.) Once the magician has gained the idea of this power through his own projective acts of will he will attribute the same power to all manifestations of the supernatural which appear to have great power. Thus we see that the idea of mana, great power, may arise from observations of unusual natural events or from unusual psychic events.

3. Power—conceived through social activities.

The third explanation of the genesis of the idea of mana is that the idea arises in social activities—when a great power is experienced.

Hubert and Mauss (37) in a very elaborate study of magic point out that the belief in a great impersonal force is the basis of all magical practises. The conception of such a force arises because the group acting together, as it does in magical practises, is very emotionally stirred and accomplishes things

it does not at other times. At such times the magician accomplishes wonderful feats and this suggests to the excited onlookers as well as to the magician himself that there is a great power at work. Without such a power magical acts could not be accomplished. In fact mana, the great power, is a "collective category"—a belief held to by a group of people.

Levy-Bruhl (50) in attempting to explain such beliefs as mana, states that primitive man's mentality must be explained by "collective representations," according to which all objects contain a mystic power. These "collective representations" are social achievements and are results of states of consciousness that contain much more of the affective and motor side of consciousness than of the intellectual. They are impressed upon the individual very often at times of social activity, and for this reason seem to have a great power back of them. Thus for Levy-Bruhl it seems to be the effect of the social experience upon the individual that gives rise to the idea of mana.

Miss Harrison, who from her extended studies upon ancient Greek religion comes to the conclusion that it is a great force which is at the bottom of the whole Greek religion, believes this great force to have been conceived from social activities. She writes (29:65):

"In all excited states whatever be the stimulant . . . man is conscious of a potency beyond himself, yet within himself, he feels himself possessed, not by a personal god . . . but by an exalted power. The power within him he does not, cannot, at first clearly distinguish from the power without, and the fusion and confusion is naturally helped when the emotion is felt collectively by the group. This fusion of internal will and energy with external power, is of the very essence of the notion of sanctity."

Cornford (9) agrees with Miss Harrison in her interpretation of Greek religion and believes that he finds traces of this same social force, mana, in early Greek philosophy. Cornford contends that at first primitive man did not attempt to *represent* the power felt in his group activities—he merely felt and lived it. Collective emotion, desire and action were all that existed in this early time. However when man contrasted his own power with that of this collective power he then attempted to represent the power felt. Mana represents the kinship of the group. But kinship in early society meant merely the *functions* of the group, what the group felt and did. The behavior of the group was its essence. Primitive man necessarily represented this kinship under some material form—which form Cornford finds to be blood.

Durkheim (17) in an intensive study of the natives of

Australia finds that they have a concept of a great force similar to mana, which is especially noticeable in their system of totemism. This great power pervades all things related to the totem—the totem, the totemic representations, the totemic species and the members of the totemic clan. The concept of this great force is due to the form of society found in Australia. The Australian passes through two phases of life, that of every-day occurrences and that of times of social meetings, *corroborrees*, when dances, etc., take place. At these latter times man is very much excited, is taken outside of himself, feels that he is entered by an outside force, finds himself able to do things that he could never do before. Feeling this power to be entering him from the outside he looks around for its source and his attention centres upon the most prominent thing in his environment, which in this case is the many representations of the totem which are present as marks on his instruments, bodies, etc. These are regarded as the source of this power and gradually this power comes to be attributed to all things connected with the totem. Durkheim believes the contrast which man must make between the times of social activities and those of daily commonplace life gives the empirical foundation for the basal characteristic of all religions, namely, the division of things into sacred and profane. We omit at this point our criticism of Durkheim's contention, that since Australian society is based upon the most primitive form of society known, i.e., the clan, and that since totemism is the religion based upon this clan system it must hence be the most primitive form of religion, since the point has been very ably raised in an article by Goldensweiser.³

4. Mana, a personal, spiritual power—conceived through social activities.

From our own study of such concepts as mana, wakanda, etc., we believe that among the peoples who hold this belief mana is thought to be a great personal spiritual power and that it is a concept which is gained through great social activity. We cannot accept mana as an impersonal force for reasons set forth in the next section. As to this force being spiritual nearly all field-workers do so call it, e.g., Fletcher, Powell, Mcgee, Codrington, Tregear, Junod, Dennett, Warneck, Neuhauss—and in the light of the use made of this concept by primitives we cannot see how else it could be interpreted. As an example of this use let us look at reports from Melanesia.

Codrington (8:119 seq.) reports that mana has three sources

³ *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. 14, No. 5, March 1, 1917, pp. 113-123.

—a spirit, a dead man's ghost, a living man. If a man has mana it resides in his spiritual part. Moreover you cannot say that a man *is* mana only that he *has* mana. After a man's death his soul becomes a ghost but only if during life he has had mana does his soul become a tindalo, "a ghost of worship." Marett (54:118) points out that mana comes very near meaning soul or spirit and turns to Tregear's dictionary to uphold this statement. "Mana from meaning indwelling power naturally passes into the sense of "intelligence," "energy of character," "spirit;" and the kindred term *manawa* (manava) expresses "heart," "interior man," "conscience," "soul;" whilst various other compounds of mana between them yield a most complete psychological vocabulary—words for thought, memory, belief, approval, affection, desire and so forth."

Such statements are widespread as we shall see when we take up this concept among the primitives themselves and cannot but convince one that by mana the primitive does mean some sort of a spiritual power. But even if the primitive did not explicitly state that he does mean spiritual power—how else can power be conceived? As Hume long ago pointed out we cannot gain an idea of power from the mere observation of external events. Such an idea must come from within our own consciousness. On this point we will quote Miss Calkin's admirable summary of the subject (5:457-458):

"Energy is generally defined as capacity for work. Narrowly scrutinized, this statement means simply that energy is conceived as the further undefined cause of phenomena; and energy is thus reduced to a relation, causality, already claimed by the idealist as ideal. Many of those who conceive of reality as energy, seem, however, to mean by energy force. But force is defined in one of three ways: either as resistance, a quality directly revealed through muscular sensation; or as a cause of motion; or as no more or less than a mathematical ratio, a measure of motion—the force of B on A being defined as 'the product of the mass of A into the acceleration of A due to the presence of B.' But each of these is a conception of the ideal, not of non-ideal reality. A mathematical relation is a mental conception; the resistance or stress which (to quote Montague) is immediately felt when a man places 'his hand between a fixed spring and a body moving uniformly into collision with it,' is a sensible quality; and motion, . . . is made up of spatial and of temporal relation. . . . You can give no unchallenged account of these qualities and relations, except as distinctive ways of experiencing, that is, of being conscious."

As to the genesis of this idea of power we agree with those writers who contend that this is given rise to by social activities. During such experiences, more than in any others, man feels himself a much greater being than he has ever felt before. He accomplishes things that he could not accomplish

before, and acting in common with others he feels himself a power never felt before. Social activity is the adequate stimulus which sets off a specific response, namely, feeling the self as a greater power than it has ever felt before.

Such an interpretation of the facts does not demand a certain sort of society to give rise to this experience of expanded greater self, but any activity involving a larger number of persons than the individual is accustomed to acting with will furnish the adequate stimulus. Such group activities are universal. Then when once this power has been experienced within the self, it can then be projected and used to explain anything that seems great. This is why we so often in primitive studies meet with the statement that mana is the power which is found in the extraordinary. Mana is the extraordinary self power felt when in the social activity and when once this power has been experienced, objects performing extraordinary feats are then explained as acting by means of this great power.

And to say that the social does play a very large part in the affairs of primitive people is not biasing the facts. So large a rôle does the social play with these people that many writers have been tempted to omit the equally prominent individualism, displayed in primitive society. Although it is a fact that the most important occasions of a man's life seem to be those of social importance, nevertheless at such times he is still regarded as an individual. Take the widespread initiation ceremonies where elaborate ceremonies are performed in order to initiate the boy into the tribe. Places sacred to this ceremony are often found, instruments used only at these times are stored away in sacred places, certain men devote their time to preparation for these festivals. Such a ceremony may last for ten days, during which time all other activities are suspended. Such time and energy devoted to the task of making a boy become a member of the tribe cannot but impress him with the power of society. And especially as these ceremonies make such an appeal to the emotional and active motor life, we cannot be surprised that the primitive holds that the society has in it some remarkable, wonderful, power, not generally experienced elsewhere. In Polynesia and Melanesia, it is pointed out by Hubert and Mauss, that the success of the chase, fishing, war, is believed to depend upon the social solidarity maintained during this time. Crimes against society which at other times go unpunished, are at these times punished by death. These same writers speak of an ancient Madagascar text which tells how when the men

are away at war the women stay up all night, keeping up the fires, dancing and chanting all night. The Dyak and New Guinea women do the same, in their chants calling for power for their absent warriors.

Among primitive peoples collective willing is very common. Take for instance the rite of Wa-zhin'-dhe-dhe among the Sioux Indians, as reported by Miss Fletcher (22). This was a rite, where through the singing of songs strength could be sent to an absent warrior in the stress of battle. The Omaha women gathered at the tent of an absent warrior and sang the songs. The songs were the medium by which the strength was conveyed to the man facing danger. Another Siouian ceremony, showing the belief in the power of collective willing, is that of Wa-zhin'-a-gdhe. This was a rite peculiar to the Han-he-wa-chi, a society of men, each of whom had done one hundreds or more deeds called Wa-dhin'-e-dhe, deeds which could be accomplished only were supernatural power granted to them. These men met together and by means of collectively exerting their will-power and by singing certain songs peculiar to this society, they willed that the full consequences of a certain line of conduct would fall upon a person who of his own accord had determined upon this line of conduct. This act left the victim isolated from all helpful relations with men and animals.

A somewhat similar idea is shown among the Kenyan people of Borneo (36: vol. I. 121). During a ceremony known as soul-catching, in which a professional soul-catcher sends his soul after the soul of the man who is ill, the soul-catcher (Dayong) struts back and forth chanting a form of words well known to the people, who are sitting around in a circle and who come in on a sort of a chorus saying, "Bali-Dayong," meaning "Oh powerful Dayong." In fact in all magical practises among these people the men and women sit around a central figure and join in the "Bali-Dayong." By the work of group volition they hope to effect their end.

Hodson⁴ gives us an interesting example of the force of collective willing. The Manipur tribes hold *gennas* (times when all the members come together and perform certain rituals). A sacrifice is always made at these *gennas*. This is led by the *khullakpa*, the village priest, who "acts whenever a rite is performed which requires the whole force of the community behind it, and this force finds its operation through him. These village *gennas* seem in many cases to be inspired by the belief that man, *the man*, the *khullapa*, when fortified by the whole

⁴ Hodson, T. C., *The Naga Tribes of Manipur*. London, 1911, p. 141.

strength and will of the village, is able to control and constrain forces which are beyond his control if unaided."

Marett (54:119) gives us an example of the belief in the power of individual willing in the case of the native of the Solomon Islands who sent him the words of a *mana* song but who said that with it Marett could not perform miracles. In order to do this he must send the native money and then "ipso facto he will transmit the mana to you—as we should say, the 'good-will' of the concern."

The prominence of Totemism as a primitive belief shows the important rôle of the social. Totemism is a bond which holds all of the members of a group together. All of this group must act together, must obey the same customs, respect the same powers, etc. Durkheim has proved, it seems to us, that the thing revered, feared or what not, in totemism is the power behind all the badges, members, etc., connected with a certain totem. This power he has shown to be the power felt by the members of a certain group when they are acting together. Miss Fletcher speaks of totemism in the following way (20:331):

"From the study of minutiae of the customs and ceremonies within the gens, it is apparent that the underlying purpose was to impress upon the people the knowledge and the duties of kindred, and that one of the most important of these duties was the maintenance of the union of the gens. This union of kindred we find to have been guarded by the agency of the totem."

Magical practices are extremely widespread among primitive people and these practices, if we accept Hubert and Mauss' careful and elaborate study, are based upon the prominence of the power which primitives attribute to the social.

All workers among primitive peoples are impressed by the rôle which social ceremonies play among these peoples. A statement by Haddon (28:51-52) shows this very admirably.

"It is difficult for us to realize that awe and reverence that was felt by these people for these social ceremonies and it must be admitted that this intense feeling combined as it was with reticence and discipline had a strong educative effect upon the people. For this reason, if for no other, these ceremonies are worthy of a very careful study. Whatever tends to take a man outside of himself and to weld him into a solidarity, limited though this may be, is an upward step in the slow and laborious evolution of man, and deserves our sympathetic respect. The paraphernalia of nearly every ceremony of all peoples are generally foolish, and often grotesque, to the outsider; but they awaken deep religious sentiment in the true believer. . . . There cannot be the least doubt that these sentiments exist among so-called savages and those who scoff at their ceremonies thereby condemn themselves."

Many persons will grant the prominent rôle of the social among primitive peoples and yet will not perhaps grant that it holds such an important place as does the concept of mana, which, as Codrington points out, is the power that all Melanesian religion and magic is attempting to obtain and which Hubert and Mauss contend all magic is striving for. It may be objected to our thesis (that mana is the power felt during social activity) that though men may act together in order to obtain mana—this does not make mana the power felt at such times. But from what other source can the idea of mana power come? We believe that it must be based upon some empirical experience. Man knows power only when he experiences power and where is the experience that will give him the idea of this great power? Surely we will all grant that during social excitement, especially when we are taking part in the social activities, great power *is* experienced. And since in primitive society nearly always the important occasions are social ones, we should expect this social power to play a large rôle. The primitive magician must have a sympathizing audience in order to work himself up to the state where he can accomplish great feats. And it is interesting to note that very often it is stated that the magician is the member of the tribe who has the greatest amount of mana. And again as Codrington points out, the position of a man in society is determined by the amount of mana which he possesses. And, as is shown by the common custom of the group getting together and by chanting attempting to send the power of the group volition to an absent one—we see that the primitive realized the power of concerted effort. From the very instinct of gregariousness man was bound to find out that acting together gave more power—especially would this be true in primitive society, where due to the relative simplicity of the life, the members of the tribe came together more often in tribal ceremonies. The almost universal ceremony of initiation indicates the prevalence of ceremonies which we believe could not but give rise to the consciousness of great power. Psychologically speaking, what this power is, is hard to say. It may be due to some physiological basis, such as Cannon has shown to be present in certain emotions. In the same way that the emotion of fear has often been correlated with the instinct of flight, we should be inclined to state that in this power felt during social activity is found the psychic correlate of gregariousness. This consciousness would undergo all degrees of intensity, which when it had reached a very strong intensity and was fused with the consciousness of

strenuous willing and acting would be called mana. We realize that careful introspective evidence is needed before such a suggestion could be finally held—but from our study of this concept among primitive peoples we cannot but believe that a careful analysis would yield a state of affairs somewhat as we indicate.

In such careful regional studies as those of Durkheim, Miss Harrison, Cornford, we believe that mana has been shown to be social and here we can but refer the reader to the studies by these writers if he wishes further proof of this contention. We may briefly indicate how Miss Harrison works out this idea in the Greek religion. It has generally been supposed that such a religion as that of the Greek Olympians represents a gradual personification of nature forces but Miss Harrison shows that even Zeus is merely a "projection of group-consciousness." This thesis Miss Harrison defends on the basis of an analysis of a recent archeological fragment excavated at Pahaistro. On this fragment is found a "Hymn of the Kouretes," a description of the older cult of Zeus which had its seat at Mt. Dikte and not on Mt. Ida. In this hymn we find Zeus addressed as the "Greatest of Youths" and he is called upon to come at the head of his Daimones, a fact that shows Zeus was once regarded as the "functionary" of a group. By "functionary" Miss Harrison means a personification of the power felt in group activities. Moreover in this hymn we find a description of Zeus undergoing the same sort of ceremonies that an initiate into primitive societies must to-day undergo. He is supposed to die and then be brought back to life. This seems to be an expression of the idea apparently almost universal, that in order for a youth to be a complete or worthwhile individual he must become a member of society, must experience social consciousness. This idea of the new birth among the Greek cults is, Miss Harrison believes, merely an expression of this idea of tribal initiation and not the revival of Spring, as has so often been held. Of this initiation Miss Harrison writes (29:19):

"Till the boy has died and come to life again, till he has utterly put away childish things he cannot become a full member of the tribe, he may not know the tribal secrets or dance the tribal dances . . . he cannot perform any of the functions of a full-grown man . . . at and through his initiation the boy is brought into close communion with his tribal ancestors he becomes socialized, part of the body politic. Henceforth he belongs to something bigger, more potent, more lasting, than his own individual existence; he is part of the stream of totemic life, one with the generations before and yet to come."

We believe then, that the consciousness experienced during social activity is the only one that could give rise to the concept of a great power such as mana. Such a power once experienced is afterward used as an explanatory concept which is applied to all things that seem extraordinary, all things that arouse awe or wonder or fear in man. These emotions in themselves will not give one the idea of power. Goldenweiser⁵ criticizes Durkheim's statement that the primitive contrasts the feeling of the social self with that of the everyday self, and appealing to similar situations in modern man states that the individual *identifies* rather than contrasts himself with the social.

"The individual identifies himself with the group, with the crowd; he represents himself as sharing in the power which is of the crowd, of the group. *We thought, we felt, we did*, is for him descriptive also of his own part in the proceedings. Social settings of this variety are so constant, so common an experience in the life of man, . . . that the average . . . individual never thinks of contrasting these experiences with others, or of regarding his crowd or group self as transcending the self of his daily routine. On the contrary, the crowd or group self is the self *par excellence*, as well as the self at its best."

This quotation is a little hard to understand. If, as it seems to admit, the self is regarded as at its best when in society, then this is all that is needed for Durkheim's theory. Goldenweiser goes on to point out that what is common in a group experience is the crowd psychology, not a specific emotion aroused. The emotion varies with the different crowd psychological situations. A crowd psychology situation may transform but never create a religious thrill. Now our contention has been that there *is* a specific state of consciousness experienced when in group activity. Doubtless, as Goldenweiser states, we may experience joy when in a crowd and it still remains joy—we may experience hatred and have it remain hatred—but if consciousness of group-self comes it is different from these specific emotions—it is consciousness of heightened activity—heightened power—of self *par excellence*, as Goldenweiser states. It is this power that is realized to be a contrast to that of everyday, individual action. As the primitive so often says, it is the extraordinary self that has mana just as it is the extraordinary external event that is due to mana.

III. IS MANA IMPERSONAL?

Most writers in describing mana have called it impersonal and since we have called it personal we are bound to consider

⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 122.

what is meant by these terms personal and impersonal. In the discussion in regard to mana we believe that the term impersonal has been used in one of three ways; as equivalent to (1) mechanical, (2) non-bodily, (3) super-individual.

Such writers as Schmidt, J. King, and Leuba who hold that mana is a force distinct from spiritual power or force use the term impersonal correctly we believe—but do not prove by appeal to the facts that it applies to mana. As we have stated before nearly all of the field-workers report mana as spiritual. But even if we did not have explicit statements that mana is spiritual, in what other way can force or power be conceived? As we have pointed out before force can not be other than ideal. Marett in a way seems to make mana mechanical force when he points out instances of external events giving rise to the idea of power. Goldenweiser⁶ also contends that “mana requires nothing but nature, acting, and man’s mind, acted upon.” Mana is⁷ “impersonal magic potency . . . to which, on the subjective side, corresponds the religious thrill.” Again⁸ “manifestations of the powers of nature always did, as they still do, impress themselves on the mind of man and arouse in him that thrill or recoil which constitutes the emotional nucleus of religion.”

One cannot deny that great events in nature impress man—that the emotions of awe, wonder, fear, etc. are aroused by these happenings—but to react with a certain emotion in the face of a certain stimulus is not to be religious as we shall contend in a later section. An active relationship must be assumed before we have religion proper. Moreover to jump from the passivity of an emotion to the activity of the cause of an emotion seems unjustified to us. Mana is an explanatory principle. “It is or has Wakanda” is said of the extraordinary man or event. It is not the fear that the lightning causes in us that makes us say that it is powerful—it is what the lightning does. What it does is perfectly evident the first time that we encounter it—but why, by what means it does this—requires an explanatory principle. This we have in mana. Lightning can blast a huge tree because it has *power*—it has that same force which we sometimes experience when we have the consciousness that we can do great things. Such a consciousness must be aroused by some adequate stimulus—and this we believe to be found in a group activity.

Most reporters and interpreters of mana *admit* that mana

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 120.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 113.

⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 116.

is spiritual or quasi-spiritual force and yet state that it is impersonal, by this meaning either that it does not belong to one concrete individual human body or else that belonging to all members of the group it cannot be personal.

Hubert and Mauss (37:105) speak of *mana* as spiritual power and yet call it impersonal. They grant however that this impersonal power tends to become represented by means of "Demons"—for man seems to judge it a more concrete representation of power when placed in a personal being. They contend, however, that the idea of a spiritual person represents very poorly the general anonymous force which gives efficacy to the magician, words, gestures, power of regard, intention, etc. These writers state that "the representations of magic are personal or impersonal according to whether or not the idea of individual beings is present." From such statements it certainly is suggested that a *body* must be present in order that the word personal be used. Of course if they simply mean by individual, the consciousness of self, then we cannot see why power based upon an experience of self should not be called personal. Of course this may be a matter of different usage of terms but if so it is a usage that has caused a great deal of confusion. It seems to us that the word personal may be used of all spiritual experiences while impersonal refers to what is generally classified as mechanical. Some writers would probably wish to retain the word personal to apply to body. But why should personal designate the body? By personal one generally means all that belongs to a concept of a self. Self very often means to a person the mass of feelings, willings, etc., that he experiences, without any conscious reference to body. Now if attention has centred upon this direct experiencing of feeling or willing, and in the future, things are interpreted in the light of the power felt during this experience, why call it impersonal?

Workers among primitive peoples show very clearly that what a primitive stresses in a thing is not its external bodily form, but rather it is the power that is thought to be in this thing. Much "pre-logical" thinking has been attributed to the primitive on the ground that he seems to disregard the law of contradiction. For instance it is stated that the primitive believes that a man can be both himself and a totem animal at the same time. But what is thought to be the same is not the external form but rather the power that is shared by both. Levy-Bruhl expresses it in this way, "*d'uns sorte de symbiose par identité d'essence.*" Radin (62:351-352) in arguing that the Indian belief is in spirits rather than in the

supposed all-pervasive force says that a confusion has arisen from not observing what the Indian believes in regard to spirits. Because spirits are not observed to have individual shapes, reporters assume that an impersonal non-individualized force is intended. But

"we are apt to make an unjustifiable assumption. Our ordinary division into personal and impersonal is made on the possession of corporeal characteristics, which are in turn dependent upon our sense-perception, sight, hearing, touch, etc. Ordinarily too the presence or absence of corporeality is the test of its reality or un-reality. What right have we to assume that the Indian makes the same classification and equates reality, with existence? To judge from specific inquiries made among the Winnebago and Ojibwa and from much of our data in general, reality does not depend necessarily upon sense impressions. . . . It is I believe, a fact that future investigations will thoroughly confirm that the Indian does not make the separation into personal as contrasted with impersonal, corporeal with impersonal in our sense at all. What he seems to be interested in is the question of existence, or reality, and everything that is perceived by the sense, thought of, felt and dreamt of exists. It follows, consequently, that most of the problems connected with the nature of spirit as personal or impersonal do not exist. . . . Whatever is the object of his thought and feelings exists."

We have given this quotation at some length as it represents the view of a first hand observer of these peoples. Radin points out that it does not follow from the fact that the primitive does not conceive of mana as invested in a certain shape or body, that he therefore necessarily conceives of it as impersonal.

Jones (41:185) brings out the same point in dealing with the custom of the sweat-lodge among the Algonkins. In this custom the manitou which is supposed to reside in a stone comes out of its abode and enters a man. The manitou in the stone is supposed to be "an objective presence; it rests on the sense of an existing reality with the quality of self-dependence; it rests on the perception of a definite, localized personality. Yet at the same time there is the feeling that the apprehended reality is without form and without feature."

Another reason that these writers give for calling mana impersonal is that it is super-individual. Mana for Miss Harrison, Durkheim, Hubert and Mauss, Cornford, is that power experienced in the part of an individual's consciousness which they call collective. When man takes part in social activities he has a very different consciousness than when he acts in isolation, and since his consciousness is shared by all, it is, these writers contend, not personal.

Cornford (9:81) speaks of it in this way,

"Outside of each individual private world of inner and outer experience, *i.e.*, of inner and outer sensations and movements directly connected with the states of the organism there is what we have called the collective consciousness of the group as a whole. This consciousness, unlike the individual consciousness, is the same in all, consisting in those infectious or epidemic states of feeling . . . which at times when the common functions are being experienced invade the whole field of mentality and submerge the individual areas."

Cornford finds that it is this collective consciousness which is read out into any specific field of nature and forms the "daemons" of Greek religion—a thesis which Miss Harrison also defends. These "daemons" are not specific concrete individuals but merely "functions," the "group-behaviors." It is for this reason, Cornford states (9:97), "that daemons in Greek theology, as elsewhere, remain impersonal; they consist of will and force without individuality, because they are each the soul; not of an individual but of a species or kind to which they are related exactly as a 'daemon' of the human kindred is related to the group." Miss Harrison extends this idea of the content of an object being merely its "functions" to the Olympian gods, stating that at first these gods were merely a projection of the consciousness felt during group activity. Later when the group had a leader we see such individual gods as those of the traditional Olympians. In the festival of the Oschophoria Miss Harrison (29:325) points out, "the very act of transition from the periodic festival with its Eniautos-daemon to the cult of the individual hero; from, in a word, the functionary to the personality."

On psychological grounds it is a little hard to understand just what is meant by this distinction of personal and impersonal. If it is mental experiences that make up the consciousness of self why is it that certain ones of these should be called personal while others are called impersonal. Doubtless in a group activity when all the members are filled with similar states of consciousness we have what may be called a collective consciousness, but surely this is for each member merely the emotion or what not that *he* is feeling. The power experienced at this time may perhaps be thought to come partly from the outside but all the time it is felt as the self experiencing it. Because this consciousness is *stimulated* by the group action is not sufficient reason to call it impersonal. This consciousness is doubtless of a very different quality from that experienced when the individual is in isolation but at both times it is certain mental complexes that are being experienced by the same individual. Durkheim says that our soul is made up of two factors—social consciousness incar-

nated in each individual and the bodily factor. But we believe that the consciousness of the self is made up of the two factors mentioned above, i.e., the consciousness felt while acting in isolation and that felt while acting with society. We shall consider this point at more length in the next section.

If mana then is spiritual power what is its relation to the soul as this has been conceived? We have stated that mana for us is merely a certain self power experienced under specific conditions. It would be very valuable if we could state in just what the consciousness of this power consisted, but such a statement would be worthless without careful introspective analyses of such states of consciousness. But though we cannot now state what the *content* of such a state of consciousness is, it is at least valuable, we hope, to point out that such a state exists and to express the belief that some day such states will be subjected to careful introspective analysis. We can only indicate now that we are inclined to think that into this consciousness of great power, would come some experience of conscious function or of consciousness of self-activity, such experiences as are now being pointed out in some introspective studies on will, etc⁹

IV. IS MANAISM PRIOR TO ANIMISM?

It is the usual thing at the present time to speak of the doctrine of manaism as prior to that of animism—to call it pre-animism. The discussion in regard to this question has shown in what a loose, even confusing way, this term animism has been used. The specific formulation of animism is, as is well known, the work of E. B. Tylor (73). Tylor, working with data gathered from among a large number of primitive peoples, found what seemed to be a belief in a "soul." This "soul" was a something variously described; at times as the shadow of a man, at other times as a small man within the man. This "soul" was the principle by which all things were explained. Tylor believed that the concept of this "soul" arose as the *conscious* answer to the question which presented itself to primitive man in regard to the phenomena of dreams and of death. The dreamer saw persons he knew had long been dead and from this concluded that there must have been something within the body that did not disappear when the body did. This observation added to the belief,

⁹ Cf. A. Michotte et, E. Prüm. 'Etude Experimentale sur le Choix Volontaire et Ses Antecedents Immédiate.' *Archives de Psychologie*, 1911, x, p. 194.

N. Ach. 'Über den Willensakt und das Temperament.' Leipzig, 1910.

universally held among primitive man, that life is present in everything in the universe, gave rise to the concept of a ghost-soul.

Some writers have adhered to this strict usage of animism but other writers would include under animism all beliefs which rise through the reading of one's own experience into other things; i.e., even before there arises the idea that there is within one a double which is separate from the body, whatever other experiences are had are read out, projected. This period when willing etc. experiences are read out into things Marett would call "animatism."

This usage of animatism seems perfectly justifiable to us, if what it means be kept clearly in mind. Tylor used animism to mean the belief in ghost-souls and it might lend itself to clearness to retain the term for this purpose. But do not let us extend this restriction to mean that there was a time when man did not have a concept of the soul—the soul meaning self-consciousness. Marett (54:14) illustrates his usage of the two terms in the following passage,

"Thus, when a thunderstorm is seen approaching in South Africa, a Kaffir village, led by its medicine-man, will rush to the nearest hill and yell at the hurricane to divert it from its course. Here we have awe finding vent in what on the face of it may be no more than a simple straightforward act of personification. It is animism in the loose sense of some writers, or, as I propose to call it, *animatism*; but it is not *animism* in the strict scientific sense that implies the attribution, not merely of personality and will, but of 'soul' or 'spirit' to the storm."

If one wishes to use the term animism in this way, as we have said, it seems to us justifiable—but to restrict the term soul to mean merely the small ghost-like "mannikin" that is often thought to be within one—does not seem justifiable. The word soul has been so widely used to mean self-consciousness that it cannot be restricted to the sense found in Tylorian animism. Soul for the primitive has not meant merely dream-double as we shall point out in our next section. Soul means self-consciousness and as such has always been present to man's consciousness. This consciousness did not begin at some specific period of human evolution. The concept of self has always been used as an explanatory principle just because the anthropomorphic tendency of man has always been so strong. It was this tendency that made man use the great power, mana, to explain external events. Mana is not *prior* to the soul for it is a *part* of the soul. Mana does not represent an idea that has grown up in an historical sense, but represents a definite psychological experience that comes to

every man. The different things that have been explained by means of mana may be a matter of historical setting or evolution but the genesis of mana as such belongs to man as man.

But the statement by many writers that manaism is prior to animism is for them more than a difference in usage of terms—it involves a denial to the primitive individual of the consciousness of self. By these writers animism is used in the sense in which Marett would have us use animatism; i.e., to mean the consciousness of personality, will, etc., which in turn is ejected outward as an explanatory principle. These writers contend that a great power such as mana is conceived *before* any idea of the soul (self) is present. They state that man does not at first, explain things in analogy to his own soul (used in the sense of self) for he is not yet conscious of himself: he is not yet consciously differentiated out from the group of which he is a member.

Miss Harrison (29:122) in speaking of the system of totemism, which she believes to be based on some such force as mana, states that man at this time has not yet drawn a distinction between himself and a kangaroo for he has not yet said, "This is I." At this time, "his human will is felt chiefly as one with the undifferentiated mana of the world." Levy-Bruhl holds to the same idea when he states that at first man was merely conscious of "participation" but that later as he began to notice himself the idea of the soul arose. Cornford contends that he finds no animistic doctrine in early society. At this early time man feels himself as continuous with the group—the collective life pervades him and he has as yet made no distinction between his own and the collective power. But gradually as self-consciousness comes, the collective consciousness also becomes individualized and we have the idea of the soul come forth. The soul is really only a "pool of mana."

From these representative statements it is plain that it is the supposed complexity of the idea of the soul that makes these writers deny the concept to primitive man. Primitive man simply had not reached the stage when he realized that he had a soul and hence he could not read his image into the universe. But to have an idea of the soul does not mean that you must have some complex, logical idea of it. Doubtless the primitive man is not a Hegelian but he does have some consciousness of self, just as every human being does. These writers seem to think that you must have some definitely formulated concept which you then consciously use as an explanatory principle, in a logical sense. But this is not

necessary for an animatistic doctrine. It seems absurd to us to deny to primitive man an idea of himself when it is generally admitted that there is such a primary emotion as self-elation. Is primitive man to be denied the primary human emotions? Moreover it is not necessary that man in a rational fashion "read" himself out into things. This may very well be accomplished in some affective way—in such a way as has been pointed out in the "affective logic" that has been worked out by Ribot, Maier, Baldwin. These writers show that generalization may be effected as well upon the affective side of consciousness as upon the sense side.

To sum up, then, we have granted that there is a group of facts found among primitive peoples which cannot be placed under the concept of animism—if by animism is meant the doctrine according to which all things in the universe are interpreted in analogy to the human soul, when this soul is thought to be like an image seen in dreams, trances, and so forth. But we have not been willing to grant that the primitive does conceive of his soul in this manner, i.e., we are not to compare his idea of dream-double with our idea of soul, as self, and suppose we are comparing the same concept. We do not deny that at times the ideas of the dream-double and the shadow have played a large, even fantastic, rôle among primitive peoples, but we do not believe that the primitive confuses these ideas with that of the soul or self.

If our contention is correct that mana is simply the power felt within the self when, due to social activities, it feels very efficient, feels an efficiency which contrasts strongly with the efficacy usually felt, then we should expect to find that the primitives had a concept of these different self-efficiencies. And this we can find, we believe, in what has been reported to be a belief in several souls. These supposedly different souls are only different experiences that the self undergoes. The following point of view kept in mind during the investigation and interpretation of such beliefs would throw, we believe, much light upon the discussion. Such a view contends that primitive man functions in the same way as a modern man, just because he is a human being. His social and historical heritage may be very different—but when it comes to the human conscious experiences he is the same being whatever his state of culture may be.

Man notices that he is a living being and he also notices that he has certain mental experiences. Moreover he has such experiences as dreaming, trances, recovery from seeming death, etc. Again he notices shadows. Also as a normal human being

he has an experience which, though mental, is different from all of these in that it seems to make him so much more powerful, namely the experience he has when taking part in a social activity. During this experience the self is felt as much greater than it has ever felt before and yet there is also a sense of identity.

As to the relation of these ideas in the mind of the primitive, our reading of the data shows a state of affairs somewhat as follows. Dream-doubles are not thought to be the same as the consciousness of self, this latter being the experience to which we would confine the use of the term soul. There is a spiritual, i.e., mental part of man which is different from the bodily as well as from the dream-doubles and it is this which is thought by the primitive to be the soul (when used in our sense of self). Mana is the power which like the soul is spiritual, personal—though just how they conceive it to be related to the soul is not so clearly stated. There are indications however, that as Codrington says, mana is thought to be a certain part of the soul or of some souls. Codrington says that mana is not soul for not all persons have mana while all have souls. This is a thing that should be expected. When sufficient observations have been made to show what mana power can accomplish—then when it comes to serve as an explanatory category, only those persons who live up to this standard will be said to *have mana*.

The question of the priority of manaism seems to us then irrelevant. We cannot find any culture where the concept of mana is present that there is not also a belief in spirits in the sense of ghost or dream-doubles. Either concept may assume the leading rôle and which concept shall thus be made most prominent in a certain society, depends upon some "happy chance" just as specific taboos do. Both of these concepts will be present, though with varying degrees of emphasis, just because they are founded upon normal psychical experiences. Such a view does not make primitive man a Berkeleyian philosopher—but makes him like a child (or an adult for that matter) who kicks the chair when he stumbles over it. It makes him a being who tends to anthropomorphize his experiences.

V. APPLICATION OF OUR THEORY TO REPRESENTATIVE PRIMITIVE DATA

In attempting to apply this theory to the facts gathered among primitive peoples, we encounter many difficulties, but most of all that of contradictory reports. For instance for

many years two Kaffir terms, itonga and idlozi, were reported to mean the same thing, namely, ancestral spirits. Dudley Kidd (43:282 seq.), believing that these terms did not mean just the same thing in the native's mind, during a period of fifteen years tried to find out just what these terms did mean to the native. As his analysis seems to be so much in point, we abstract from it at some length.

The idlozi is an individual thing born with the child in the course of nature, is never lost during life, even though the person should become a Christian. At death the idlozi continues its individual existence near the grave of the dead man. The idlozi cannot transcend space and each man has an idlozi to himself. The itonga on the other hand may be divided among the various members of the family. It is not born with the child but is imparted to it by a ceremony after birth. It can depart from a person who abandons tribal custom. It then returns to the grandfather or to the bosom of the amatongi (ancestral spirits) from whence it came out. It has the power of being in several places at once and may be living in the huts of a number of persons at one and the same time and can also at the same time be an immanent spirit in several people at the same time, as if it were a deity or being of wide powers. In fact a hundred people may share an itonga. When the tribe migrates the idlozi of the individual stays near the grave while the itonga goes with the tribe. Mr. Kidd suggests that the idlozi is the individual side while the itonga is the corporate or clan side of personality.

In our more detailed study of the beliefs of certain African and Australasian tribes, let us first consider whether these people *do* mean by the soul what we have contended they do—namely, a consciousness of self or mental experiences. So often it has been stated that by the soul these people mean the mere phenomenon of living or they mean the shadow or they mean the dream-double. That the primitive does relate these things in an intimate way, a way which often leads to confusion in dealing with their beliefs, we must of course grant—but there are too many indications that these things do *mean* different experiences to him to allow us to group all the experiences together and say—this is what the primitive means by soul.

Nassua (57:53-55) who has given forty years of close study to the tribes of West Africa, has a very illuminating discussion of the meaning of soul among these people. He divides the reports which he has received from the natives into four groups.

"1. Ordinarily, the native will say in effect, 'I am one, and my soul is myself. When I die, it goes out somewhere else.' 2. Others will say, 'I have two things,—one is the thing which becomes a spirit when I die, the other is the spirit of the body and dies with it.' But it has frequently happened that even intelligent natives, standing by me at the side of a dying person, have said to me, 'He is dead.' The patient was indeed unconscious, lying stiff, not seeing, speaking, eating, or apparently feeling; yet there was slight heart-beat. I would point out to the relatives these evidences of life. But they said: 'No, he is dead. His spirit is gone, he does not see nor feel; that slight movement is only the spirit of the body shaking itself. It is not a person, it is not our relative; *he* is dead.' . . . Such attempts to distinguish between soul-life and body-life has not infrequently led to premature burial. . . . 3. Another set of witnesses will say that, besides the personal soul and the soul of the body, there is a third entity in the human unit, namely, a dream-soul. . . . 4. A fourth entity is vaguely spoken of by some as a component part of the human personality by others as separate but closely associated from birth to death, and called life-spirit. . . . Others speak of this vague life-spirit as the 'heart.' . . . The natives believe that by witchcraft a person in health can be deprived of his life-soul, or 'heart;' that he will then sicken; that the wizard or witch feasts in his or her magic orgy on this 'heart,' and that the person will die if that heart is not returned to him."

Here we certainly see the soul as different from the dream-double as it is from the mere phenomenon of living. The fourth entity seems to us suggestive of some of the ways in which *mana* is found to be used. It reminds one of the *itonga* that Kidd reports. Significant is it that it is this that the magician desires when dealing with a person.

Ellis (18:155) tells us that the tribes of the Gold Coast of Africa have a belief in two individualities—the living man and the tenanting *kra*. When the man dies the first of these becomes the ghost while the latter becomes a *sisá*, and is then born again. *Sisá* in this way seems comparable to *itonga*. Talbot (70:139) states that the West African believes that the body and soul are entirely different; that the soul is the real man and cannot be destroyed, while the body is something different and inferior, and temporary, and rots away when no longer needed. Junod (42:Vol I:339) tells us that the Thonga locate different psychic qualities in different parts of the body, such as patience in the liver, etc.—"Yet they certainly believe in an independent psychic principle, in a soul."

Similarly we have reports from Australasia that show that a distinction is made between consciousness and mere living. In Motlav, Codrington (8:250) states that the word for soul is *talegi* and it is believed that a ghost can take the *talegi* away from a man and "the man just lies breathing in his chest." Brown (4:193) upon asking the natives of New Britain why

the soul survived the body received the reply, "Because it is different, it is not the same nature at all." This difference is shown also by the belief among these peoples that when a man recovers from a faint or from unconsciousness it is due to the fact that his soul was refused entrance into the other world and was driven back. The man was observed to be alive but his soul or consciousness was gone. Seligmann (66:185) reports that when a man among the South West Koita people falls down unconscious on the road it is because a *tabu* has taken his *sua* (soul). The *barom* (66:734) among the North Massim people was thought to leave the body without death ensuing. A man who lay motionless and scarcely breathing for seven days was thought to have been without his *barom*, which during this time visited the upper world. Among the Mafulu Mountain people (78:266) it is thought that man has "a mysterious ghostly self in addition to his bodily and conscious self." It is hard to know just what is meant by this as Williamson does not tell us what a bodily conscious self is. Best (1:103) states that *toira* (soul) "represents the spiritual and intellectual welfare of the genus homo; while his physical health or welfare is described by the common term *ora*." These quotations show explicitly that soul does not mean mere living.

As to the soul being the same thing as the shadow we give the following representative quotations. Junod in speaking of the Thonga people says (42:Vol. 1:339) that they do not fear to tread on the shadow. "It may even be questioned if they identify the material shadow with the *shitjhuti*, the spiritual part of man which separates from his body at death." Dennett (13:79) who has done a great deal of excellent work among the tribes of South Africa says that when you read a report which says that the same word means breath, shadow, ghost, soul,—you may be sure that the observer has misunderstood the native's thought. "The Bakulu, or souls, of the Bavili have nothing to do with shadows." Routledge (64:240) states that the soul does not depart during dreams or trances for it is the soul that gives a man his individuality, will, ego. Leonard too (49:139) says that it is the soul that gives a man intelligence. Surely soul and shadow are not here synonymous.

Similarly in Australasia we find statements by reporters that souls and shadows are not the same. Codrington (8:250) mentions a belief that a spirit could lay hold of a man by means of his shadow . . . "the shadow being in a way another person or man. But that the shadow was the soul

was never thought." Seligmann (66:189) reports that among the South West Koita people of British New Guinea the words for soul and shadow are entirely different—*sua* for soul and *laulau* for shadow. Nowadays this latter word is applied to photographs and images seen in mirrors. Among the Roro-speaking tribes he finds a similar difference—*anba* for reflection, *oriorena* for shadow, and *tsirava* for (66:309) "the vital forces or essence within an individual precisely as the Koita use the term *sua*." Sometimes the word *tsirava* is used for spirit, although *beriwa* is generally used to mean spirit. Among the South Massim peoples at Tubetube *yaruyarua* was soul and *kwanukwanuna* was shadow. At Bartle Bay however *aru* was reported to mean both soul and shadow. Keyser¹⁰ states that the Kai people of German New Guinea have an idea of soul which is more inclusive than ours in that it included the shadow as a part of it. The soul in fact for these people pervades the body as does warmth. The Kai believe in two souls—that which survives after death, resembling man on earth except in body—and the other is the spiritual essence or soul stuff, which pervades the body as sap does a tree.

In regard to the Fiji Islands there has been some little discussion about the meaning of *yalo*, which was supposed (77: vol. I:24) to be the word for soul and yet to mean shadow. Fison (reported by Frazer¹¹ from a letter of Fison's) thinks this a misapprehension because *yalo* means soul while *yaloyalo* means shadow. Thompson (72:354) writes, "It is difficult to say precisely what the Fijian believes to be the essence of the immortal part of man." The word *yalo* has the following meanings: *yalo* (with pronoun suffixed) means mind; *yalo* with the possessive pronoun separate means shade or spirit; *yaloyalo* means shadow. "From the possessive pronoun being suffixed we may gather that the mind was regarded as being as intimately connected with a man's body as his arm, but that the spirit could be detached from it. . . . The question of the material of the ghost was as much vexed as it is in English ghost stories."

Let us now consider some of the statements about the great force *mana*—let us see what relation we can find between beliefs in regard to this power and in regard to the soul. We have seen that *mana* belongs to the spiritual side of man and can only be originated by personal beings. We have seen that in Melanesia those who during life have had *mana*

¹⁰ See (25:268).

¹¹ See (25:411 seq.).

become powerful spirits, tebarans, when they die. Now what indications are there that there is among the African tribes a belief in such a power? In looking for evidences of such a belief it will be well to bear in mind that for many years it was reported that the Indians believed in a Great Spirit, an All-Father, but that later more scientific, if not more careful, work showed that the Great Spirit was really a great force.

We find an exactly comparable state of affairs among the Masai in Africa in regard to the beliefs about *Ngai*. *Ngai* for many years was supposed to be a supreme God, a great spirit. But Hinde (34:108) reports that the Masai have an idea of *Ngai* as "the Unknown" and *Ngai* "embodied their apprehension of power beyond the human faculties of coping with. Thunderstorms, rains, the telegraph, a railway engine are all referred to as *Ngai* and the word represents the incomprehensible, of which they are vaguely conscious. . . . In a case of accidental homicide or injury it is regarded as the "will of *Ngai*." Routledge (64:226) in describing *Ngai* among the East African writes, "The being thus described is not visible to the naked eye . . . the sun, moon, lightning and rain are all in a sense worshipped as manifestations of the great Power, a conception apparently not dissimilar to that of the poet when he sings of the One

'Whose robe is the light, Whose canopy space.'

The prayer of the medicine-man when he invoked divine aid is addressed to God, the sun of Kenija as 'all the same thing.'

Livingstone reported that natives of Central Africa believed in the existence of a supreme being called Mpambe and also Morungo (Mulunga) but that Mulunga means a supreme being is questionable in the light of Hetherwick's observations. Hetherwick (32:91-94) reports that the Yaos of the Lake Nyassa region, as well as a large number of other Central African tribes, believed in a great God, Mulunga. Mulunga, Hetherwick states, is impersonal although he finds such statements as that God made the world, man and animals, hard to reconcile with the impersonal idea. Now among these people *lisoka* is the word that means soul, spirit, shade and was both personal and impersonal. *Lisoka* moreover *becomes* mulunga at death and is then an object of veneration. Mulunga is a term that is not, however, reserved for the soul after death but is applied to anything mysterious. "It's Mulunga," they cry when the unusual happens. Also when a man is especially lucky he says, "It's my Mulunga." Hetherwick in his description of Mulunga seems to agree with Miss Werner who describes Mulunga as (76:55) "the great spirit of all men, a

spirit formed by adding all the departed spirits together." Hetherwick also states that Mulunga is the aggregate of human dead souls but not personified. "It is to him (the Yao) more of a quality or faculty of the human nature whose significance he has extended so as to embrace the whole spirit world." Miss Werner however reports that not the whole of the soul lives on but only a part, the *lisoka*. Surely in this report of Mulunga we see more than an impersonal god. Mulunga is that which accomplishes the extraordinary, just as *mana* and *wakanda* do. It is that which runs through the whole spirit world. Only a part of the soul lives on and thus becomes venerated. This belief in a part of the soul as living on seems to be quite common in Africa and seems to be comparable to the belief in Melanesia that it is a certain part of the soul or certain souls that live on to be *tebarans*, the most powerful spirits.

From a study of the tribes of South Nigeria, Talbot gives us very interesting observations and suggestions. Among the Ekoi the term for supreme God is *Obassi* and among the Beni it is *Osa*. *Osa*, however, among the neighboring Yoruba tribes is the generic term for "*juju*" and thus Talbot seems to suggest the possibility of a relationship between "*juju*" and Great God. In regard to "*juju*" Talbot writes that it is a very hard term to translate or understand, though it has generally been defined as "spirits which are present in things." This hardly covers all the usages that he finds as for instance it would not properly describe the Ekoi *Njomm*, which Talbot says can only be translated as "*juju*," and which seems to include all incomprehensible mysterious force, the lowest form of which he compares to the "Melanesian *mana*." This report is merely suggestive of what the relation between a great god and such a power as *mana* may be, but it is sufficient to indicate a rich field for future study. If "*juju*" should turn out to express a belief in such a power as *mana* rather than in spirits it would be interesting to see if the same thing did not hold true of what is termed fetichism. Nassua (57:81) tells us that fetich is equivalent to the following native words. The native word on the Liberian coast is "*gree-gree*," in the Niger Delta, "*juju*," in Gabun county, "*mondi*," among the cannibal Fang, "*bian*." If all of these concepts should turn out to be powers like *mana* we should have a very fruitful field for comparative study. Pechuel-Loesche¹² thinks that magical power rather than spirits is behind fetichism.

In South Africa Junod (42:339 seq.), reports that the belief

¹² See (30:45 seq.).

among the Thonga and Ronga tribes in regard to "*Tilo*" is very hard to understand. This belief in *Tilo* is similar, he believes, to the belief in a Supreme Being found among all the Bantu peoples, a God known under the name of Nzame among the Fan and a great number of West African tribes—Mulunga among fifteen East African tribes—Nkulunkulu in Zululand, etc. *Tilo* seems to mean Heaven but it also means great power, the power in unusual things; storms, death, convulsions, etc. Several beliefs comparable to *Tilo* we have suggested are beliefs in a power like mana—may it not be that this too will turn out to be the same?

Dennett (13:85 seq.) working for many years in South Africa states that the religion found here may best be called—Nkici-ism, and that it has the following characteristics. *Nzambi* is the great god and the literal meaning of his name is, "the personal essence of the four." Now by the "fours" is meant the group of four powers called, *Bakici Baci*, powers which are spiritual and are connected with objects regarded as sacred. They are in a way offspring or attributes of *Nzambi*. It is *ki-ci* that signifies that they belong to the great god—for his power is *ki-ci*. In an article later (15:261) than the book from which these statements have been taken Dennett states that the power *ci* is similar to that of mana or wakanda. An interesting feature in this group of facts is that the chief of these people has as one of his titles, Nkicici (Kici on earth). Here we see kici as the great power vested in the chief of the tribe. The socially great are those who have the most mana.

These quotations are sufficient to show that very probably Africa must be counted as one of those regions in which a belief in a great force has sprung up. Moreover we see that this power is very closely related to the spiritual part of man known as the soul. The very close relation which we find between a great power and the Supreme God, we shall consider in more detail in the next section.

As to Melanesia as we have stated Codrington reported that the belief in mana was universal—the whole of magic and religion consisted in obtaining this power. The belief he thought to be common to the whole Pacific.

Explicit statements in regard to this concept among the Polynesians are not so numerous¹³ but we find it stated that *atua* among the Maori, *ane* or *hau* among the Powape, *kasinge* or *kalit* among the Pelew, *anut* among the Kusai are concepts comparable to that of mana. Featherman¹⁴ wrote

¹³ See Marett, p. 126 seq.

¹⁴ Social History of the Races of Mankind, Vol. II, p. 207.

"The generic name of *atua* which is applied to every kind of supernatural being and mysterious objects did not convey a distinct idea of god or of divinity, . . . was a mysterious something which they could not explain, a name given to all active agencies of nature whose mode of action was incomprehensible to them. . . . The strangers that first came among them sending thunder and lightning by the discharge of the fire-arms were *atua*."

Corvan who spent his life in New Zealand states that *atua* means gods. *Mauri* seems similar to mana for as Corvan says (10:107):

"Deep in the heart of the Maori-Polynesian was a belief that everything in nature had its *mauri* or soul-force. . . . The term *mauri* is a difficult one to explain clearly to the *pakeha*¹⁵ mind. It can generally be translated as 'soul' but the Maori does not intend to convey the idea that animals have souls, when he speaks of their *mauri*. Again forests and cultivation-grounds have their *mauri*, the intangible quality that makes them fruitful as sources of food-supply."

Best (1:102) gives a somewhat similar report. Both Corvan and Best report a belief in one God, (*Iho*) held by these people. Statements about *Iho* however very closely resemble those that have been made about Wakanda and we must remember that for some time Wakanda was reported as God. Corvan (10:108) writes that *Iho* comes from the root *iho* meaning the animating force in all things, the primal energizing principle. Best states that *iho* is "the vital spirit in all things."

These quotations are sufficient to impress upon us how much a careful field study is needed to show us what the interrelation of these concepts is. We certainly see an indication that the great power, whatever be its genesis, is certainly that which gives a basis for the belief in a great, supreme God.

Among the tribes of Borneo, Hose and McDougall report facts that certainly suggest a belief in a force comparable to mana. The Kayans believe in two souls, "a ghost-soul or shade . . . and on the other hand the vital principle." The Kayans believe that they are surrounded by spiritual powers—some of which have bodily form and others of which are very vaguely represented as merely a "vital principle." In regard to the Kenyans of Borneo—they write (36: vol. II, 29).

"They may be said to attribute a soul or spirit to almost every natural agent and to all living things, and they pay most attention to those that seem most capable of affecting their welfare for good or ill. They feel themselves to be surrounded on every hand by spiritual powers, which appear to them to be concentrated in these objects to which their attention is directed by practical needs; adopting a mode of expression familiar to psychologists, we may say that

¹⁵ Foreign or uninitiated.

they have differentiated from a 'continuum' of spiritual powers a number of spiritual agents with their various degrees of definiteness. Of these the less important are very vaguely conceived. . . . The more important, assuming individualized and anthropomorphic forms and definite functions, receive proper names."

In regard to the use of the word *Bali*, which is applied to the Supreme God, to the messenger of this deity, to the minor deities—these writers say (36: vol. II, 29)

"The word *Bali* is used on a great number of occasions, generally as a form of address, being prefixed to the proper name or designation of the being addressed or spoken of. The being thus addressed is always one having special powers of a sort that we should call supernatural, and the prefix serves to mark this possession of power. It may be said to be an adjectival equivalent to the *Mana* of the Melanesians or of the *Wakanda* or *Orenda* of the North American Tribes, words which seem to connote all power other than the purely mechanical."

Kruijt¹⁶ in writing of the animism which he finds in the Indian Archipelago states that inferior peoples go through two stages of development. First there is a sort of force scattered through all objects which make them alive and doing, this force is not yet individualized; second there are individual spirits that inhabit everything. The difference in these two outlooks is due to differences in the mentality of the social group. In the first the individual consciousness is not separated from the collective, the sentiment of participation dominates; but in the second the individual has a clear consciousness of himself as distinguished from the social group. As we have stated before we believe these two concepts may be held simultaneously, not necessarily successively.

Warneck (74) has perhaps the most complete study of a people in this group of islands. He studied the Batak people of Sumatra very carefully and finds that the soul-cult is the very core of their religion. He criticizes Kruijt's study as being too broad and too lacking in discrimination in dealing with different areas. The important thing in the religion of the Batak is the rôle of the soul-idea—*tondi*, a "life-strength, life-material, or soul-stuff." The description of this *tondi* is very akin to that of *mana* as several writers have suggested. Warneck states that this idea besets the mind and dominates the practises of the Batak. It is what gives efficacy to the gens and to all things. It radiates in the chiefs and in the powerful. It determines the fortune, rank, moral character of the individual. It comes from the "stock" of souls in the over-world. This belief reminds us of a similar one which

¹⁶ See *L'Année Sociologique*, Vol. XII, pp. 273-275.

Durkheim stresses in Australia as very important for his theory of the totemic principle, and hence mana, as being social. Although the *tondi* is the *soul-stuff*, on the other hand it is the *roha* that determines a man's personal consciousness, his I. But that the *tondi* is spiritual is shown by the fact that the different functions of the *roha* depend upon the *tondi*, often the will of the *tondi* and that of the *roha* are in conflict.

This report may seem hard to interpret and doubtless it is. With our constantly-present preconceptions of what the primitive should believe—our commonly accepted belief that Tylorian animism covers the primitive's religion—it has been hard to get the primitive's real thought recorded. We cannot help seeing however that the primitive idea of the "soul" includes a power which is very widespread among the other parts of the universe.

To sum up then, from a consideration of this data we cannot but believe that the concept of such a force as mana has played a large part in the life of primitive man. Primitive man as well as modern man felt a scale of values in his life. Some things are more powerful and more to be desired than other things. Some things and events give the impression of being extraordinary. The question naturally arises, "What is it that causes these extraordinary events? An answer to this question becomes possible when man has *experienced* a power great enough to do extraordinary things. When is this power experienced? From a study of the great rôle of the social among primitive peoples it seems to us that only one answer is possible—it is the feeling of the social. When one sees the leading rôle that social activities have played among primitive peoples one would expect some influence coming from the consciousness of heightened power which is always experienced in a live group activity. And that we do see it, we believe to be shown by the extended rôle which the concept of *mana* plays. Mana, we believe, is the power which man experiences when he is acting with his group. Given such an explanatory principle it is bound to function to explain all extraordinary things just as we see it among the Melanesians, Africans, Indians.

VI. IS MANAISM RELIGION?

Just as animism was very generally called religion—so too manaism has been called. But *is* manaism religion? Before we can answer this question, we must state what we understand by religion. Students of religion have approached its

psychology from two sides. One group has stressed the differentiating mark of religious phenomena as a certain specific attitude on the part of the subject toward the object or objects; while the other group has stressed the specific object or objects toward which the attitude is maintained. Most writers implicitly combine the two, that is religion is defined as a specific attitude toward a specific object—but their stress is generally upon one side or the other.

When you turn to those who stress the object toward which the attitude is held you find emphasized either the object in itself or some unseen being or force behind the object. For instance you find it stated that man's first religion is worship of stones, then trees, then animals, etc. Many writers accept Tylor's definition that religion is a belief in spiritual beings in all things surrounding man. Others contend that belief in spiritual beings is not sufficient for a religion, but that these beings must first be raised to a rank greater than man. Just how these objects happen to become raised to the rank of beings great enough to be worshipped has not been very clearly made out. For instance, Leuba, who insists that the differentiating mark of religion is the *kind* of power on which man feels dependent and from which a certain kind of behavior is elicited; states that this power is felt to be hyper-human and refuses to accept merely spiritual beings as hyper-human. The reason that certain objects come to be regarded as powerful enough for religious objects is due to the "useful" habit of man's mind "to ascribe to unseen beings without regard to their original nature, the ability to supply all the wants of the tribe and the individual. . . . It is a truly remarkable habit,—that of imagining in other beings coveted powers and virtues" (52:112). Many writers make the building up of a god a slow evolutionary process. Perhaps an animistic soul has been singled out and gradually through legend or custom has attained the rank of a god. But whatever the process by which the god, power, or what not has been reached—it must be just such an object before we have religion.

For those writers who stress the psychic attitude as the important thing in religion—we find disagreement as to what this attitude is. Marett as we have seen gives as the core of religion, "supernaturalism, the attitude of mind dictated by awe of the mysterious." Some writers say the sense of the sacred gives us religion, others speak of a religious thrill, others that dependence is the psychic mark of religion. We cannot here enumerate the many states of consciousness that have been emphasized as the basal ones of religion but

we will pass on to a treatment of what we consider to be necessary in order to have a religious consciousness.

In our study of what has been termed the religious experience the following statement covers the factors involved. One feels dissatisfied with himself and makes appeal to a power whom he regards as greater than himself and whom he is confident can give aid. In speaking of this power as personal we use the term personal in the sense which we have already indicated. The question arises—How does one know that there is such a power? Perhaps, someone will contend, we have been told that there *is* such a power, but if one has no further knowledge than this, we do not believe that he can have the confidence necessary to make a truly religious appeal. One finds in reading accounts of religious experiences that they are always described in personally experienced terms. One always *experiences* God or the Power or the Universe, etc. Now before one can appeal to a greater power, we believe that he must know that this power really exists and this he can only know if he has experienced greater power. And, as we have so often said, we believe that he experiences this power in a group activity. We must remember however that to *experience* this power is not the whole of religion. In order to be religious one must feel dependent upon this power and make appeal to it. Unless a person has had help from an object he will not go to that object expecting help. Hence we must explain why man believes he can gain help from a god or other object. He believes he can gain this help because he *has* gained this help, or power. Let us look a little more in detail at the social experience in which we gain the idea of great power. In this experience we find two poles of emphasis: one the power on which the self feels dependent, and the other the power which the self owns or is. In this social activity one feels dependent upon all around him, feels a great power rushing into him from without—but also he feels that he is the one who is experiencing this power—he is the one who can now do wonderful things. During the experience these two aspects are not entirely separated but are in some fashion fused. This power which one feels at this time is not felt as simply an addition to his usual power but there is a qualitative peculiarity in it which is not present in any other experience. It causes a sense of expansion of the self, of happy acceptance of the power felt. Now having gained this idea of greater power the self when he has again sunk to the level of his usual efficiency will at times, remembering how much more powerful he was

at certain times, become dissatisfied with himself and will make appeal to what he regards as having given him this wonderful power, that he once felt. He has experienced this power and so is confident that it exists. The various objects that different peoples have appealed to for this power is to be explained by the fact that different things have attracted the attention as having power equivalent to that which the self has also experienced at certain times. This then is the reason that so many objects have functioned as religious ones. Let an object be observed to accomplish extraordinary things and it will be thought to have great power. What more natural then, than to appeal to this powerful object later when power is desired by the self. Power *has* come in from the outside before—it can come in again. Supposing a man comes back to his social group feeling dependent upon it and asking for the same wonderful power he once received from it—he is, we believe, religious. But as we have said *any* object may function in this way.

If we look at some of the classic psychological accounts of religious experience we will see that the facts quoted lend themselves very well to the interpretation which we have given. For instance let us look at James' account. For James the whole religious phenomenon can best be envisaged as that due to the "divided self." Man feels himself incomplete and there follows the experience of new-birth or the twice-born character. James writes (39:167):

"The psychological basis of the twice-born character seems to be a certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitution."

James goes on to point out that in all of us, proportionately to our sensitiveness, there is a chaos of higher and lower feelings which for character to evolve must be straightened out and unified in the inner self. Unhappiness and sense of incompleteness result during the reconstruction. One must feel himself incomplete and must surrender himself before he will experience the phenomenon of religion—if he has done this he will be rewarded by having the Holy Spirit rush into him. James writes (39:211): "One may say that the whole development of Christianity in inwardness has consisted in little more than the greater and greater emphasis attached to this crisis of self-surrender." If the self succeeds in surrendering and experiences the second birth he will notice the following things about his religious consciousness. He will feel that he is

of a wider life than that of this world's little selfish interests; will feel convinced of the existence of an Ideal Power; will feel a sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal power with his own life and a willing self-surrender to its control; will feel an immense elation and freedom as the outlines of the confusing selfhood melt down; will feel a shifting of the emotional centre towards loving and harmonious affections.

Now this greater power of whose existence we must be convinced James believes to be truly existent and moreover existent as the sub-liminal self. It is here that "motives deposited by the experiences of life" "incubate" and "when ripe the results hatch out, or burst into flower," in such experiences as conversions, etc. James thinks that psychology has proved that the subconscious does thus break over into the ordinary fields of consciousness. In such incursions we feel ourselves in relation to a "More" and (39:512):

"The 'More' with which we feel ourselves connected is . . . the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. . . . In the religious life control is felt as 'higher;' but since on our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our hidden mind which are controlling, the sense of union with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally true." James seems to be well satisfied with this hypothesis for he says (39:512) "Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary theologian lacks."

All of the marks which James gives of the religious consciousness do indeed seem to be present, but in the *interpretation* of these marks we differ from James. James himself criticizes his own theory in the very way in which we should if our own theory is to stand. He writes (38:509): "The practical difficulties are: 1, to 'realize the reality' of one's high part; 2, to identify oneself with it exclusively; 3, to identify it with the rest of ideal being." We believe that our theory answers these three questions. Man realizes the reality of his higher part from experiences which he as normal human being is bound to have, namely a social activity experience. This higher self for us means more efficient, more powerful self and must not be confused with the term higher self as it is used in ethics. By the latter one means the self using its energies to accomplish certain specific ends *judged* more worthy. Again our theory explains why man identifies himself with this power by showing that he cannot help identifying himself with it because he finds himself *being* this power. Moreover since this power is experienced when all around are experiencing, when, as Durkheim has pointed

out, one is first experiencing unity—he necessarily identifies himself “with the all of ideal being.”

James thinks that the sense of incompleteness comes to man because he is a being containing a chaos of higher and lower feelings—but what can this mean other than that man experiences different complexes of consciousness under different situations. We are not born with a mass of separate feelings *labeled* higher or lower, only in so far as these feelings are carried into action and accomplish different results can they be called higher and lower. And this is just what our theory explains. When certain conscious states occur it is when we are experiencing ourselves as selves of a certain efficiency and when others occur we are experiencing ourselves as of other efficiencies. If there is a difference of efficiencies of these two selves then we have ground for comparison and when the self feels incomplete due to the fact that he has before felt more complete he will try to put himself in a position in which he has before felt more complete. We cannot believe that a man says, “Now I shall relax, now surrender myself” and straightway the Spirit rushes in. He does not do this unless he has experienced the Spirit rushing in and felt its benefits. Men or even dogs do not stand expectantly before windows which have never thrown them crumbs. We are just as anxious as James to preserve contact with science and we believe that we have shown a natural empirical experience in which all the factors necessary for a religious experience are found.

Our theory is like Durkheim’s in that we make the contrast of the social and the individual self the basis on which religion is built up,—but whereas he makes everything connected with the social—sacred, and hence religious—we would include within a religious complex only those objects which are regarded as capable of giving help; the judgment of this capability depending upon observations of what these objects can do. Sacred, i.e., social, does not make religious—it is supplication that does this. Moreover we differ from Durkheim in regarding the power which makes the object capable of being a religious object—a personal and not an impersonal one. Our theory agrees with animism in holding that the soul is the important thing in religion but it is the soul or self that is experienced as very efficient that is anthropomorphised to become a god.

In all of this we see simply an ejection of a little drama within a person’s own mental life. The functioning, experiencing side is we believe the same in all persons. Man due

to his very make-up will by social contact of his immediate family gain some idea of himself.¹⁷ The idea of this self or soul then serves as explanatory category of things that seem of equal power. Then as a social being man is bound to take part in a larger group activity,—be it his own family, with himself as member of course, pitted against his neighbor; his school against another school—or even acting as a whole; his tribe gathering for a sun-dance, or a tribal initiation ceremony—and in this shared activity he receives a peculiar experience in which he feels himself a thousand-fold strengthened. This experience in turn becomes an explanatory category.¹⁸ During this latter experience besides feeling more efficient, he feels dependent upon those around, upon the power entering him—and yet he feels that this power is like his own power—even *is* his own power and thus there arises the sense of the continuity with a great Power and also the conviction that this great Power can help him.

Such an explanation of religion takes into account those primitive forms of religion which are based upon securing power *as* power, i.e., mana: and also those historical religions which have to do with a great Power, but a power vested in a God.

VII. IS MANAISM MAGIC?

In the space of this article we can only give a few indications of the way in which we believe mana to be related to magic. As we have seen, mana has been made by Hubert and Mauss the force which is at the bottom of all magical practises, and since we believe this to be true—let us see how magic will connect with our attempted psychological analysis of the state of consciousness that gives rise to the idea of mana.

Generally, following the lead of Frazer, the acts called magical have been classed as those of imitation or sympathy and those of contagion or contiguity. In the former we have acts in which a *representation* is given of what is desired to take place, for example the act of pouring water in order to make the rain fall: while in the latter the principle of contact is used in order to make that which is desired

¹⁷ The manner in which this idea is built up has been worked out very adequately by Royce and by Baldwin.

¹⁸ It must be remembered that by explanatory, we do not necessarily mean rational in the sense of "intellectual" conception—but rather the primitive "functions," in an affective or motor way, his explanation. He *acts* toward things *as if* they contained certain power like that he has experienced.

take place, as when a man obtains the hair of his enemy so that by torturing the hair the torture will effect the one to whom the hair belongs. Hubert and Mauss criticize this explanation of magic, pointing out that by the principle of contagion *all* things that are near the contagious object would be affected, not merely as in truth is the case, the one that is *intended* to be affected. Moreover all the qualities in the contagious object are not transferred, only those *intended*. Again, consider the fact that the current of this transfer may be interrupted. The transferred quality may be *directed*, as for instance the malady of the eye is sent to the *eye* of the lizard rather than to any other part. Thus the important things in magic, according to these writers, are—the abstraction of certain qualities, the exclusive fixing of attention upon certain things, and the direction of the intention. Similarly imitation is criticized as a working principle in magic. These writers divide all magical practices into manual and oral but state that even in the apparently manual practices really it is the intention of the magician that is important.

Marett states a similar view in saying that the “spell” is the heart of the magical affair—the “spell” really being an imperative willing. It seems then that there is now a tendency to interpret magical practises as those in which imperative willing comes into play. Mana, a great power, is necessary to accomplish the desired results. But mana is a power given rise to by social activity and is a power which every man is bound to experience. Why then is it that only certain persons are magicians? We have seen that in the experience that gives rise to the consciousness of mana there are two poles of emphasis: one on the externality of the power and one on the internality of the power. When the former pole is emphasized we have the basis for religion and when the latter we have the basis for magic. Who then will be the magician? He who during this experience of social consciousness is thought because of his actions to be the one having the most of this power—mana. It has often been pointed out that the primitive magician is the one who is of a nervous disposition, who is perhaps subject to hysterical fits. Such a person is the one who in social activities, due to lack of power of inhibition, would exhibit to the greatest extent the effect of his feeling of heightened activity. It is with this power that the magician works. That it is the power aroused by social contact with which the magician works is suggested by the fact that the magician must have a sympathizing audience with which to work in order to accomplish

his results. Another belief which indicates that the primitive realizes that the arousal of the magician's power is dependent upon action with others is that the magician must very often sojourn in the land of spirits before he can become a magician. Among the Veddas a magician is taken possession of only during public ceremonies.

As to the relation of magic and religion the discussion seems unending. We shall state only two views—that of Hubert and Mauss, (37) with whom Durkheim agrees, and that of Hartland (31). Hubert and Mauss criticize Frazer's theory in which he makes magic a matter of constraint and religion one of conciliation by saying that often the gods were constrained and that in the Intichiuma ceremonies which Frazer classifies as magic, the totems were solemnly invoked. These writers believe that the differentiating mark of religion and magic is to be found in the fact that the religious rites are those of an organized cult which take place in society and in an "open place" while the magical ones are individualistic and seek the "shades."

Hartland holds that magic depends upon the exercise of the personal *orenda* of the magician while religion is an effort to get the *orenda* of a more powerful being to accomplish the desired end. Our view of the relation of magic and religion is then the same as that of Hartland, i.e., in magic one who has found he possesses a great deal of power attempts to accomplish certain results, while in religion help is solicited from one who is thought to have a great deal of power. Hartland will not admit however that the idea of this power is aroused during social activities. He believes that the idea of this power is awakened by external nature although he grants that the consciousness of power gained in social activities may organize and intensify this power that has been conceived from watching external nature. We have already criticized the view that nature can give rise to the idea of a power, independent of man's experiencing within himself this power. Also it seems to us that Hartland does not allow room for the very common characteristic of the religious attitude whereby aid is asked for the solicitor in order that *he* may accomplish a certain end. It is not always asked in religion that a being do a certain thing because of the great power which he possesses—but he is often asked to give power to the solicitor. Confidence that such power can be attained demands a specific experience in which power *has* been gained—and this we believe to be found in the group activity experience.

In order to illustrate our position let us look a little more closely at a custom which is quite widespread among the North American Indian. This custom or rite is known among the Omaha Indians as No'n'zhi'nzhoⁿ. It is a rite that takes place at puberty. Miss Fletcher and La Fleche say of No'n'zhi'nzhoⁿ. (19:128 seq.). "The literal meaning of the word is 'to stand sleeping;' it here implies that during the rite the person stands as if oblivious to the outward world, conscious only of what transpires within himself, his own mind. . . . At the period when the youth is at the verge of his conscious individual life, is 'old enough to know sorrow' it was considered time that through the rite No'n'zhi'nzhoⁿ he should enter into personal relations with the mysterious power that permeates and controls all nature as well as his own existence." The origin of this rite is told by the Omaha in his Sacred Legend. "The people felt themselves poor and weak. Then the old men gathered together and said: 'Let us make our children cry to Wako'n'da that he may give us strength.' The old men said to the youth, 'You shall go forth to cry to Wako'n'da.'" In explanation of this rite the Omaha said, "The appeal was for help throughout life. As the youth goes forth to fast he thinks of a happy life, good health, success in hunting." In preparation the youth was taught the following prayer. "Wako'n'da, the permeating life of nature and man, the great mysterious power; here, poor, needy, he stands, and I am he. Here, poor, needy he stands, and I am he." This prayer was called Wako'n'da, gikoⁿ and meant, "to weep from the want of something not possessed, from the conscious insufficiency and the desire for something that could bring happiness and prosperity. . . . The words of the prayer set forth the belief that Wako'n'da was able to understand and to respond to the one who thus voiced his consciousness of dependence and his craving for help from a power higher than himself."

In this rite we see an explicit recognition that man must feel dependent upon the great power and must ask it for aid. The suppliant is not asking Wakonda to do certain things but to give him aid in order that he may be powerful.

A criticism which has often been made of the social explanation of religion may be considered at this point. It is said that such a theory leaves no room for the rôle of the individual often seen in religions and one points to the Messianic religions of the North American Indians as a case in point, stating that here we surely see the tribe borrowing from the individual. This may be true but, we believe, that

a reading of these very religions will show that the Messiah gained his ideas from some social communion—very often from “sojourning in the land of spirits.” The rite of Noⁿzhi-zhoⁿ has also been cited against the social origin of religion—for here, it is said, we see the Indian boy receiving his religion while in the mountains alone. But as we have seen, the Indian boy goes out with a firm belief that he will thus be put into communion with Wakonda, the permeating life of all. We would suggest that the individual reformer in religion is the one who has very well developed within him the sense of the “oneness of all things.” We cannot work out this thesis here but can only say that the lives of such reformers give us this suggestion.

To sum up then our position in regard to these facts we would say that when a man has once experienced mana he may emphasize either the fact that this power came from the outside and that hence he was dependent upon it for his efficacy, or he may emphasize the fact that he is the one who is experiencing this power—he is the owner and therefore a great man. If he feels the former emphasis he is more apt to appeal in after times to an object which he believes can give him this power again, and thus he would be religious. But if he feels that it is he that is great—especially if the group from watching his feats agrees in this judgment—then he is apt to try to use this power to accomplish unusual things and is thus magical. As to the relation of constraint and conciliation in magic and religion we believe that constraint upon a god may be attempted by a magician just because he is so filled with the idea of his own ability to do great things but so long as it is constraint we are in the midst of magic, not of religion. The religious object on the other hand must be invoked and if this takes place toward the Australian totems then we are in the midst of religion and not of totemism. We cannot constrain in religion because the psychological mark of the religious consciousness is that of dependence upon a power regarded as greater. We cannot conciliate in magic because the psychological mark of magic is that of consciousness of great power as owned. That *systems* of religion and magic are closely intertwined in both primitive and modern religions and magics we cannot deny but the psychological root of the two always remains separate.

Manaism then is neither religion nor magic—it is rather, one might say, a fundamental psychological experience. It is merely the experiencing of great power in, we believe, a social activity. It may become the explanatory basis of almost any

sort of experience. Mana power may be invested in *any* object—the object determined by the particular environment in which it is placed. As we have so often pointed out the whole thing is an ejection of our own conscious life in which experiences of differing intensity and quality give us the basis for comparative explanatory principles.

VIII. CONCLUSION

1. There is evidence from all parts of the world that animism, in the Tylorian sense, does not form an adequate basis for primitive man's early reaction to his environment.

2. There are groups of customs and beliefs in this early society that justify the use of some such term as manaism to represent them.

3. Manaism as well as animism results from the tendency of the human mind to interpret things in terms of its own inner experience.

4. Animism is "reading into" things the individual self and manaism is "reading into" things the social self. (Individual and social self used in the sense we have explained.)

5. There is no justification for calling mana an impersonal force.

6. The question of the relative priority of animism and manaism is irrelevant.

7. Mana experienced within the self and then ejected into an object (a fact which shows that the object is regarded as greater than the individual self) and which in turn is supplicated for aid, forms what is known as religion.

8. Mana experienced within the self and then stressed as the part of the self which makes it capable of effecting things beyond the usual power of man gives rise to practices known as magical.

9. Religion is not a specific objective content, but rather an attitude toward, an appeal for, power which has once before been experienced.

10. Different objective *content* with which experience is knit up forms the difference between primitive and modern man. There is no difference in the reacting, the functional side.

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